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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

EUTHYPHRO, MILL, AND MR. LEWIS

JOHN Stuart Mill's eloquent defiance of the non-good impostor god he conjures up in the *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* has been associated not infrequently with Socrates in the *Euthyphro*. It has not, I believe, been noted that what may be taken as the basic logical thesis of the *Euthyphro* can serve to call Mill's general ethics itself before the bar of this eloquence—or to discount the eloquence by the test of the cooler theory of its author. A good utilitarian, a hedonist and pure consequence man, would not have a leg to stand on in his defiance of the almighty. The consequences, as Mill postulates them, would be altogether painful, bad, and the action altogether bad, foolish. Yet in view of the quality of Mill's vehemence here, and of other evidence, I think if he had been persuaded he had to give up one or the other Mill would have stood by his "one thing he shall not do" challenge to consequences.

And as for Socrates and for Mill so now for us, whether we know and what we know in choosing and feeling makes a difficulty for our theories.

I have mentioned the conflict of prized attitudes in Mill to two philosophers and had replies in substance the same: "Well, Mill thought there were some things worse than hell." And I think this is true. Mill will not contemplate himself as worshiping that which he can not call good. But on his own official ethics I see no reason why he should not.

You say it could be put in terms of consequences: among the consequences of his acceptance of heaven on the terms set is his awareness of the unworthiness of his acceptance. Now we must be careful of calling this sort of retrospection a consequence, and whether or not we do so we must be careful to note if we are trying to derive from the occurrence of some partly cognitive activity a definition of the quality which presumably is being cognized.

If "consequence" is any happening that comes after and in any dependence upon another, then in the consequences of an act there are two different sorts. There is the dynamic outcome of what is done, as the light is the consequence of pushing the electric

switch. So opening the window lets in the air that cools us and enacting a law may increase justice and comfort for thousands. ("Effect," as the correlate of "efficient cause," limits the range in this direction, but is apt to limit it too narrowly to physics.) There are also, or may be, cognitive dependencies of the action, consequences, perhaps, but not effects. We look back upon it, or our doing of it, or someone's doing of it. That we look back may be an effect of the happening of the happening, but what we see is its character. If we like or dislike it, if feeling elements are involved, the resultant ("result" seems more purposive or culminative than either "effect" or "consequence") seems inseparable from a valuation we put upon the action in retrospect, which as judgment (including perception, or perception including judgment) is the same as judgment of the present. And though the value aspect is important for us throughout this argument and the time aspect helps make the difference clear and is important for our argument with the utilitarians, the difference remains beyond time and value, for it is the difference between the watering of my eyes caused by the brightness of the light I look at and my perception of the brightness of the light, between the chilling effect of the snow on my feet and its warming influence among my literary associations.

Now elementarily a theory that limits the nature of good should limit approbation to that which the theory approves. Where is the unworthiness Mill is supposed to foresee himself looking back upon? His own books tell him always to make that choice which brings the greatest pleasure and the least pain. He has done so and should be conscience-clear. A hedonism and consequence doctrine can allow my present self-accusation as I look back upon having done something which I now see I could have rejected as threatening pain—can allow my present self-accusation to reinforce the pains directly flowing from the action, and of course can applaud such a reinforcement of present pleasure by retrospective self-congratulation. But it can not bring in self-accusation on unhedonistic grounds either as bad effects of the action or as a way of saying I am disapproving the action because of its consequences —obviously so when all of its consequences otherwise are good.

If both sorts of consequences in all their actualities and possibilities be admitted in the hedonistic goodness or badness of acts, then it becomes ahead of time impossible to disprove a general hedonism or the doctrine that no action has any good or bad apart from its consequences. For whatever be the nature of good it can always be translated into the recall view and feeling of it and then be called a consequence and hedonistic. So if virtue be allowed

to be in any sense its own reward, the "selfish theory" is established. We are brought to the discovery almost everyone makes sometime, usually in high school, that everyone does what he likes to do.

In such a theory as that of Socrates an emphasis upon cognitive consequences is proper enough. The goodness of the act, the goodness of the self that is looked back upon, that is looked forward to, that is looked forward to as being looked back upon, is real apart from these consequences. It is basic to the Socratic position to urge (as in the *Gorgias* and the *Theaetetus*) the need at times of disregarding bad dynamic consequences and yet to hold it sure that knowledge of what-is-good-for-one could not do otherwise since our need is good conscience and our closest companion is ourself and bad is not good.

But as used by utilitarians the lumping of dynamic and reflective consequences is either hypocritical or false: it either fails or spoils the theory. For by the theory the whole value of the action is in the consequences and retrospection has and can have relevant character only in the light of that value. Consider the limiting case of an action with but the one consequence, the later reflection upon it. The action can have value only in its consequences, but the reflection has nothing to reflect except its own emptiness.

And so when Mill can not contemplate himself worshiping what he can not truthfully call good, I think he is being Socratic. He ought in all consistency with even his revised Benthamism have mocked that god by being exact in all the forms of worship, gone comfortably to heaven, congratulated himself on his utilitarian virtue, been sorry to be sure the world did not have a more enlightened governor, and tried to get word back to the world for the greatest number to follow his example.

An earlier phase of Mill's argument—his semantic unwillingness to use the word "good" of a god the doctrine of whose being seems untroubled by the actuality of things which do not seem good to Mill—does gain by his identification of good and pleasure. Refusal to accept the identification makes a chance, for the non-hedonist, not to go all the way with the argument that because of the pains of the world we must say if there is a God he is not good. Here Job is more difficult, more dangerous, but more open and profound than Mill. In the climax of Mill's argument, however, where it is assumed there is "such a being" and that he is not good and where Mill asserts the badness of calling him good, here the doctrine that good is resultant-pleasure-only is destructive of the

conclusion, which will then depend upon finding pain in the recognition of the badness of an action which has averted pain.

Nor will Mill's sometime, and proper, recourse to habit and example here be of help.

And this is the dilemma of any doctrine which confuses the basis of discrimination with its outcome. Having lied and gone to heaven, or having been heroic and gone to hell, one might call the lie good or the heroism bad in view of the heaven or hell, or call the lie bad and the heroism good in view of the character of each action "as such," or one might with common sense take both in view and try to balance the reports; but now we are told to find each good or bad just on the basis of the outcome of our finding.

The earlier hedonisms were attracted by and made use of the down-to-earth determinateness of pleasure. But, under the pressure of experience, pleasure came to associate with itself the feeling of being pleased, which differs from pleasure in suggesting that the person has the feeling in view of some state of affairs which pleases him not just by its existence—as a blanket may give pleasure to a chilled sleeper—but by the person's recognition of its existence or by its appearance to him. The feeling of being pleased may be always, or normally, or at least sometimes the "consequence" of cognition, cognition discriminative of its object since obviously it may be we have the feeling of being displeased.

Now the favorite modern disguise for the cognitive that does not want to admit deference to its object is in feeling words. And these, if they be at all selective, bring us against the warning I take to be the central thesis of the many-valued *Euthyphro*.

Socrates is willing to let "what is dear to the gods" be so just because of the god's "action"; and one might, without logical troubles, define piety as what is dear to the gods. This could serve even for the gods if, I think absurdly, "being dear" be taken as quite unperceptive and arbitrary or accidental. And it could serve operationally for men if we assume it is enough for them to know something is dear to some of the gods. But Socrates holds it impossible that all the gods should "love" the same thing unless there be some character in that thing for the gods to discern and he holds it clear (and Euthyphro willingly agrees) that in piety there is that character which "is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved." Ethically (Socrates and Mill) sufficiency of the gods' love as a rule for men will depend upon men's assurance that the gods' love is not unperceptive and that the gods are good. In this case what-the-gods-love is not constituted by their action of loving; it is the ground, the object, the incitant, the goal, the content recognized by their knowing. And not even the gods can

take a verb meaning perceptive selection and with its passive define the object to be selected.

An action can give a name to the objects it falls upon—as the rain sends wetness upon the just and the unjust. "A thing is in the state of being carried because it is carried" and if I go down the street shooting indiscriminately, those who are hit are sufficiently characterized as hit because hit by my bullets; but if I go out to shoot my enemy and succeed, the court will not be content to characterize him as dead because hit by my bullet, he is dead because he is my enemy and I meant to shoot him. If the action is selective, if it falls upon these rather than those, it needs a basis of selection; and, if it insists it alone gives the definition of the name it confers upon its object, it can not at the same time find in the object any guide to its falling or not falling. This is so even if the selection is automatic or a "natural selection." If it is perceptive it must be reminded it has the peculiarities of knowing, notably the hazard of error along with the postulate of fact.

We can say (I think preposterously) that all choice is arbitrary (I think some choice is arbitrary and sets up value). We can speak of all feeling as unperceptive and accidental. But then we can not speak of discrimination of things as good until after the choice, or use any guide or corrective of feeling. Mill's defiance is not arbitrary or accidental nor is Socrates' piety or even Euthyphro's.

Put from the subjective end—that is, from the gods' end in the *Euthyphro*—the principle seems obvious enough: One may not be called on to discriminate a characteristic which is defined by the discrimination. I can and do pick at random sometimes and give a name to that which I have picked. But I can not pick by the criteria of that which I shall have picked. And present feeling, if it comforts by recalling something of the just-effect possibility of pleasure, should warn us that here it must be the effect of something observed in the object of our choice, should warn us that it is a sufficient sign that here the picking is not at random. I may wish to choose, without caring what I choose, and get a good feeling after choosing at random. It is then the determinate state of commitment as opposed to non-commitment which pleases me. I may wish to be a partisan in art and decide to be a cubist although any ism would do as well. After a while cubism as such will come to please me, in all probability, although at first it was only the commitment which pleased. It would be hard to make this fundamental or all-inclusive; and if it were so made it would mean that commitment would be the one good, and this it would be incumbent

on us to discriminate from its opposite if any of its or its derived good feelings were to be achieved by us.

We choose, and reflect upon choice, and reflect upon our reflection, and may do all three at the same time. But in discriminative choice is implied judgment, and each judgment must be directed at something other than itself and must be determined by something other than its own outcome. Epimenides the man may say to himself as he says something, "I am lying," and he can say, "This is a lie"; but the proposition "This is a lie" can not have itself as antecedent of its own "this." And if Epimenides the man when he says "This is a lie" does mean by "this" something other than that proposition itself, then he can not judge that other true or false unless he knows what it is saying and something of what it refers to.

I can not discriminate round and square if "round" and "square" mean no more than what is discriminated as such. As what?

If there ever seems doubtfulness in this it is perhaps because of confusion between the understanding of a word and the application of it. We know what "round" means but are not always sure what things are round, not always sure what is meant by saying a *thing* is round, not sure whether we ought to say with Protagoras that what seems round is so. But here by "seems" we mean an appearance, not a decision of ours—an appearance as to which we can try to decide how clearly it meets the specification and then as to whether it is "just an appearance." Hamlet may have meant and probably did mean many things by "There is nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so," but if he meant what is often suggested in its quoting he meant an impossibility.

From the objective end, if we are told: A characteristic is not constituted just by the discrimination of it, it is obvious. But it may be put: One may not define a characteristic in terms of the discrimination of the characteristic by some mind. And here our positivistic tradition gets in the way. This, we say, is the way we like to define.

But it is doubtful if any extreme operationalist ever does try to do this. We set up an operation to tell "simultaneous" from "successive" and we define "simultaneity" in terms of the operation. But we discriminate (not to go back to the discriminated intention behind the choice of operation, which may involve repugnance to the principle) by observing actual signals not sent by our discrimination.

So I must first "see." If badness consists only in resultant pain, I can see the badness only in the pain, I can not get the pain

from seeing the badness. If goodness is determined by my feeling, I am not to get my feeling from seeing anything good.

The simple principle is clear enough; it is not, I think, clearly denied or intentionally violated. Like all other obvious principles and more than most it is violated by all of us through inattention and in the combination of separated parts of theory. Frege, in his justly celebrated essay, identifies the *Bedeutung*, the denotation or reference, of a sentence with its "truth value." Elsewhere, even in the same essay, he seems to accept the usual view that what is referred to is the basis for truth or falsity: we find out if an assertion is true by comparing its *Bedeutung*. How can we now find either without having found the other?

Violation of the principle is abetted when characterization is in terms of consequences, for then cognition may disguise itself among the causes or effects. Mill has illustrated the latter with especial vividness because of the vividness of his non-utilitarian eloquence against Mansel. But it has been a constant danger of infection in all hedonism, the more so the more "broadminded" it is, the more it adds "pleased" to "pleasure."

Pragmatism not infrequently fails to safeguard itself against the reproach of using cognition illicitly as a cause of what cognition is discerning. Truth, we are told, is determined by consequences. Consequences are sometimes taken as consequences of belief, of believing a statement. Believing ordinarily means accepting as true. How can there be honest consequences of an action which is nothing but a decision as to those consequences? What is the consequence of believing that the consequence of a belief is—what?

In either direction it is not the time span or the test by works that makes trouble for the utilitarian or the pragmatist, it is the disguised cognition: perception and the object of perception interpreted as, respectively, effect and cause or cause and effect and so as nothing but cause and effect in the non-perceptive sense. Things do something to us and we do something to things, but we should keep our vectors clean.

Hobbes's theory, and Spinoza's, seeking basis in the physicists' principle of inertia, is sometimes just about put, by each man, in terms simply of Hobbes's motions "toward" and "fromward": we call that good that we pursue and that evil that we flee from. This is the prince of naturalistic accounts if it can be kept strictly to the described motions. But in that case whenever we move the world is half-and-half good and bad and perspectively graded, and when we walk back and forth the half-worlds interchange goodness and badness every few seconds. Pursuit is selective. We cause

our motion but the object through our discernment of it has something to do with our pursuit. What is approached by us, as Socrates and Euthyphro put it, is "in a state of being approached" just because we approach it, but what is pursued by us we pursue because of what we see, or suppose we see, it to be before the pursuit. Spinoza, like Hobbes, puts the attitude creative of good often in terms of desire—"good because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it." All these words are in ordinary men's usage both emotional and cognitive. However often mistakenly, men presume a reason, a differentiation in the object when they strive, wish, long for, desire. Often in Hobbes and Spinoza we are not sure whether we are seeing and thereby deciding what to desire, or desiring and thereby deciding what it is we see.

Desire may in part be caused, as thirst is caused by inner dryness. But normally desire is in part the outcome of the discernment of a state of affairs, inner or outer, and of another imagined state of affairs as desirable. If desire be kept in its purely descriptive role, then an ethics founded on it will be, for all its "relativism," an "absolute" doctrine. As in the case of all absolute doctrines it will confront the other Socratic question, "Why is this good?" If knowledge be admitted into the ground of desire, then that which is discerned in the object as ground of the desire must be allowed to be good as differentiated from that which might have been discerned as the ground of aversion.

If in knowing Spinoza's God I do not know him as lovable I will find no pleasure in him, there will be no "pleasure accompanied by the idea of the external cause," and no love; for Spinoza's God, like the Idea of the Good, does nothing for me except through my knowledge of him.

Pleasure and desire and love, too, are results of both physical stimulation and cognition, and are causes and grounds as well. It seems less easy to forget the cognitive antecedent with love; but love has an additional equivocality in its powerfulness, its creativeness, the evident sort of "irrationality" of its cognitive aspects.

Mr. Santayana, the classicist modernist, uses both pleasure and love in his value teachings and perhaps passes on to younger writers some of both sorts of confusion and interfusion: of dynamic with cognitive in antecedent and consequence; of affective with perceptive functions in feeling. "The lover but not his love is deceived," and "Nine-tenths of its cause are in the lover, for one-tenth that may be in the object." This one-tenth Mr. Santayana is apt to forget except in the sense that "love celebrates the

initial triumph of form and is deeply ideal." "Beauty is pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing," and "Values spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of vital impulse, and from the irrational part of our nature." But also, "The pleasures of sense are distinguished from the perception of beauty, as sensation in general is distinguished from perception; by the objectification of the elements in perception and their appearance as qualities rather of things than of consciousness." And "That the quality 'good' is indefinable is one assertion and obvious; but that the presence of this quality is unconditioned is another and astonishing."[1]

"Triumph of form" but "irrational part," "inexplicable" but "conditioned"; "of two such lessons why forget the nobler" if not "the manlier one"?

In general since Mill we have come closer to the Athenian expert on piety. Despite our naturalism and perhaps because of some romanticism we are less hedonists than men of feeling. To be sure we have gone from the gods' feeling to our own and if we have made it the basis of our values it is rather by way of depreciation than piety. At any rate much value theory seeks words that will draw in both feeling and perception, be both affective and cognitive.

I suppose the most influential of such duplex words has been Mr. Perry's "interest." It is only fair to say that clearly no duplicity is intended in it and that if it has owed some of its popularity to its potential duplicity it has owed it also to the width of view, the honest carefulness, the competence of the book in which it was chiefly presented. And it is fair to note that Mr. Perry explicitly and neatly if briefly recognizes the epistemic point in the dangers here concerned.[2] He thinks that in setting up interest as object of judgment he avoids the danger, and in part he does; but the doubt is whether in the primary arising of interest itself there is not a judgment which can not be directed upon that interest just about to be.

Similar questions as to duplicity apply to the "prizing" of Mr. Dewey (sometimes) and of Mr. Lewis, to Mr. Lewis's limiting

[1] *Reason in Society*, pp. 30, 22, 6; *Sense of Beauty*, pp. 49, 19, 50 f.; *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 141.

[2] *General Theory of Value*, pp. 128, 129 f.: "He who . . . holds that values are both known and created in one and the same act, does imply the impossibility of knowing anything whatsoever about value." "There can be no judgment about value, or about anything else, unless there is some content other than the act of judgment itself."

of intrinsic value to "the realization of the quality of immediate goodness in the experience," to felt goodness.

Does interest spring from nothing as it casts its goodness upon the world; or is it grounded, and if grounded is it so as physically caused, psychologically impelled, or drawn by what is cognitively discriminated? Do we appraise only by repeating a prizing which is blindly originative or does our prizing derive from some appraising? Is a felt goodness a feeling that something is good or is it a good feeling; and, if the latter, what is it I feel when I feel that a good feeling is fooling me?

Mr. Lewis is anxious to establish a position against "Protagorean relativism." As Mr. Perry sets up interest as an object so Mr. Lewis turns to things to which we attribute "extrinsic" value and appeals to "terminating judgments" about their future behavior as mistakable and verifiable. But as there is doubt about the arising of interest itself, so doubters will look to Mr. Lewis's "intrinsic" value, and the only intrinsic value and the only touchstone of value is the directly had feeling. Is this feeling selective? Does it find itself under the command of Euthyphro's gods to pick out an object to love as being an object loved? The evident retort to this complaint is that the feeler refers back to previous seeings and feelings. This is to say that all prizings are originally caused and never grounded in perception. And this is a sort of consequence doctrine which may, like Mill's ethics, stumble against an outcropping of facts about our likings, facts unsophisticable by the honesty and insight of Mill or Mr. Lewis—that we are at times unclear as to whether or not we like and that at times we clearly like or dislike our liking. I will not say that Mr. Lewis could not within the limits of his own doctrine find rescue, perhaps in a hierarchy of "meta-prizings"; but I suspect the outcome would be old-fashioned enough to take aback some who most prize his naturalism and pragmatism.

It is possible to define the word "good" as directly applicable only to some mode of awareness, say a "feeling." It could then be said (1) that this feeling has no causes or determinants but just appears or does not appear. Or it could be said (2) that this feeling is caused by one or many sorts of thing or event but is not cognitively brought about. (So "burn" or "tickle" might be used. Here common sense would be apt to say: Put words where you will, the important thing is to find out what will give us the feeling. If a salty taste is the only good it is well to distinguish between bacon and fresh pork.) And it could be said (3) that this feeling which is the definiens of good is the result of the perception of things or events describable apart from the feeling

consequent upon their discrimination and apart from any value (as if the feeling which is goodness were the result of being aware of a salty taste without any logically prior ascription of goodness to a salty taste).

Now this last may seem a peculiarly dogmatic subjectivism, as deriving the subjective feeling from a perceived fact without allowing any objectivity to the reason for the derivation. On the other hand the thesis may seem almost essential to any doctrine not subjective. Part of it is essential, that is, if value be allowed to be at all "tertiary," dependent upon or functional with the otherwise describable character of a thing. And it would seem all schools allow this. Even if value be a directly observable quality, at least sometimes it varies with other qualities of the object; and even if value be nothing but a feeling in me, it is sometimes determinately resultant from facts outside. Our approval of fish changes with the spoiling of the fish. Then I as an objectivist must perceive the value of an object in the perception of its characters; and if I admit any feeling for value, as I do, then the feeling will be consequent (though at one step removed) upon the perception of the prevalue character.

And perhaps the crux of the matter of feeling is here, in how this situation is described, how these three possible factors are ordered. Is there first perception of character, then recognition or ascription of value, then feeling? Or is it perception of character, feeling, and consequent ascription of value? Do I in all cases, all first cases, in which perception plays a part, do I have to canvass my inner experience to detect any feeling there (I can not both detect and value it, for this would call for another feeling) before I call the thing out yonder good or bad?

I do not know that persistent ingenuity can be denied the power to assert this. But perhaps I can plead that when I look at the supposition of the truth of this theory I do not find in myself any good feeling and so I can not be required to say that it would be good to believe it. And we know there are times when we say "good" and do not feel good, and feel good without saying "good." This may be accounted for on the basis of experience and verbal habit. When we open a refrigerator a light lights but sometimes it fails. We could say that all we mean to begin with by "the refrigerator is open" is that we see the light, and that now, in the absence of the light, we say the refrigerator is open because the association of ideas or a conditioned verbal reflex or some other familiar formula leads us to intercalate the idea of what usually follows certain muscular movements. Of refrigerators, however, we do not say such things.

And we can ask the theorist whether he admits, as Mill taking Mansel to task, any good feeling from the perception of that which directly gives pain or is incapable of directly giving pleasure. Such feeling seems clear not only with the martyr but with the little selfish gratifications of unselfishness. The cynic may legitimately claim for "doing good to others" the cynical advantage of escaping the disappointments which follow doing for ourselves, but he has breached the completeness of his cynicism when he has admitted, if he has, the primary good feeling that follows the doing for others. To be sure, the imagined theorist now being queried is under no compulsion to be a cynic. He may on his theory of the procession of good feeling from unaccountable but determinate perceptions be at an extreme of luxuriant acceptance from the bare exclusions of cynicism; but then he is going to be hard put to it to frown off the easy accountability on other doctrines of the goodness of doing good for others. On this theory it would seem it might as well be the case that we should get good feeling from doing ill (as sometimes we do, unworthily, in the view of common sense) and then that would be good.

If we were in the world of Mr. Santayana's truly pretty and prettily question-begging story of "minds in which the transformations of nature were mirrored without any emotion" and if we were then given "emotional consciousness" and found ourselves in a world of value,[3] what would we say had happened? That we had been newly gifted with the ability to perceive facts that give us feelings? Or that we had been gifted with feelings that make us create facts? Or both?

At any rate the third rubric—that the feeling which is the definition of good is the result of the perception of the non-valuationally describable characters of things and that these things or characters are not to be called good except as that which causes, not directly but through the mediation of our knowledge, that feeling in us which is the only good—this third rubric is the assertion of a hazardous mystery, hazardous in that if it ever became less blank a mystery it would lose its virtue. For if we came to understand—really understand or feel we understand or "explain" so as to understand—why these things give us this feeling (as we accept it as natural that, good feelings being good, it should give us a good feeling to seek good feelings for others and that if it gives us a good feeling to cause bad feelings for others it is because we are envious or otherwise malicious and that it does not or ought not to give us a good feeling to perceive ourselves as

[3] *Sense of Beauty*, p. 18.

malicious; and as most of us would find it hard to accept as natural that pain generally should give us a good feeling) if we came in any way to understand why these things give us this feeling it would be hard to keep us from defying Spinoza's dictum and saying "These things we desire because they are good." So when I look at a theory and, calling it true, find no good feeling in myself; and I think I know why; it is hard for me not to say: I do not think the theory is true, and I think it is bad to call true what I do not think to be so (like Mill, "good," and the god Mill does not think good); and I do not think I ever got that way through assessing the feelings I have had as a result of my logical or reportorial decisions.

If the good feeling supervenes upon the perception of this rather than that, then we can list the thises and thats for one person and many. And then we can allow or forbid criticism. And so we are back with the choice between "pleasure" and "being pleased" and with the warning of the *Euthyphro*. For the link between the perceived character and the feeling will either be, like pleasure, a pure fact to be accepted, or, like being pleased, an activity itself partly critical and lying under a should-be. If that which gives me a good feeling is "in that state" just because of my feeling, like that which is "in a state of being carried," we can leave it to be whatever it is; but we can also leave ourselves free to reject both it and its good feeling. We are offered an absolute doctrine and we can ask "Why is this good?" If that which gives me a good feeling is or might be like that which "all the gods love," if it can be sent by a jury of presentment to a trial jury to show if it is good or reasonable or not unreasonable as a giver of good feeling, this calls for a criticism of which the criterion can not possibly be in its own outcome.

Pointing to the instrumental value of things, as Mr. Lewis does, while proper and needful, sometimes seems beside the point and perhaps never gives all the objectivity Mr. Lewis himself asks. Even in committing ourselves to futurity what we need might seem to be "terminating judgments" as to whether we will keep on liking the liking the thing may keep on giving us. And Mr. Lewis is importantly aware of one needed passage beyond the instrumental test. Yellowjackets sting, and after we have been stung the sight of yellowjackets may thereby be displeasing. If the past sting is all I know of yellowjackets and I then find something pleasant in the sight, the theorist will have to look beyond associated utilities. And so Mr. Lewis comes to the "inherent" but not "intrinsic" value of things (as in beauty) which "have a value disclosable in the presentation of them." But again there

is the hesitancy: how can somewhat be "disclosable in the presentation" of that which does not have it?

The theory becomes more difficult—the theory, that is, that seeing what we see gives us a good feeling but that we must not say this is because we see any goodness in what we see—the theory becomes more difficult in one way if we are allowed to put the propositional "that" before what we see, more difficult in another way if we keep away from the "that." Perhaps when I see an icosahedron I get a good feeling, but if it gives me a good feeling to see that a thing is an icosahedron it is going to be hard for me to say that I do not see any good in a thing's being an icosahedron. So the moralist; but the artist finds the more secure and objective satisfaction in its non-propositional beauty. And the analyst will decide, I think, that either of these must ultimately derive from that which is "disclosable in the presentation" of something, within us or without. If Mr. Lewis's good feeling is "intrinsic value" it must also be for Mr. Lewis "inherent value" since it is that which in its presentation discloses its value to Mr. Lewis's reason.

Can we not imagine Socrates's man with but the one inclination, subjective push, to itch and scratch? Can we not imagine his being aware of his case and considering it objectively? Can we not imagine his saying "Why not?" and going on his scratching way? But it is no longer just inclination, it is rationally justified and chosen action. For can not we imagine him saying to himself, "I prefer to see myself as declining the inclination"? And this rule too is chosen. To be sure, our stipulation reminds us that the choosing can not be subjective, must be arbitrary or rational as in the object.

And this is one way of putting the fundamental issue as between objectivist and subjectivist. Is the liking I would really like, in view of but not as the effect of all my peculiarities—is the feeling I get from seeing an icosahedron, a lie, a kindness; the approval or disapproval I get from reflecting on that feeling, the satisfaction I get from meditating on that approval—is this in the ideal upshot that which any mind properly clarified would have in the perception of that whole situation; or would we then just be in Mr. Santayana's world without preference—a super Buridan's ass that can not even get an appetite?

It may be that in this final, non-actual, ideal but as ideal necessary, confrontation there is little beyond the verbal difference to be found between "It is accepted because it is good" and "It is good because it is accepted." But with each retraced step into the subjective-objective actuality the issue is more important; for now

it is the difference between taking our feelings as constitutive and thus infallible and recognizing them as partly cognitive and thus possessed of the peril of mistake and the glory of discovery.

We have looked at three connected theses. Among consequences that curious consequence which is knowledge may have its perceptive curiousness overlooked (Mill against Mill). We would be at least misleading if we said so-and-so's children were not at all interested in him but only in what he had left them and if we then included in what he had left them pictures, a diary, and their memories of him. And among actions that curious action which is knowledge may have its perceptive curiousness overlooked (Socrates against Euthyphro). We would be at least misleading if we said there is no difference among so-and-so's children except the different amounts he left them when we know that he chose among the legatees by some method other than tossing a penny. These two theses seem clear.

If perception be granted a role in discrimination, then the further order of dependence as between feeling and "tertiary" character remains unclear; but the use of feeling as unclearly both affective and perceptive makes a continuing peril of falling into the two clear errors.

The easiest of the morals we have drawn is the caution as to the word "consequences." Here Mr. Lewis's clarity helps us illustrate the confusion. He says[4]:

> The first such dictate is the imperative so to act that he will not later regret his decision and be sorry for what he has done or for what he might have done but failed to do. Without the possibility of such self-approval or self-condemnation and the recognition of some kind of rightness or some wrongness in actions done or contemplated, there would be no self-consciousness of personality. If it should be asked what ground this imperative has, then there can be no other answer than this: that it belongs to human nature to be thus concerned for the future and not merely for the present and to blame ourselves for weakness of will if we allow our actions to be governed by impulse or by present satisfaction or dissatisfaction, without respect to future consequences. . . . This . . . may be regarded as prudential only and directed to consequences of action for ourselves . . . self-interest alone.

[4] "The Meaning of Liberty," in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (special number) 6, p. 16. This paper, two years after *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, is a beautiful brevity, with much of Kant and Mill. One wonders whether the putting together of Kant, who thought to ban consequences but succeeded only by sometimes treating consequences as judgments, and Mill, who thought to ban everything except consequences but succeeded only by sometimes treating judgment as a consequence, is facilitated more by their inherent rightnesses or by their inversely common wrongness.

Shall we be prudent and beneficent as to the effects of our actions? Shall we hope that when we look back our doings will seem gracious and honorable? Yes; but if we do both let us not suppose that either is nothing but the other.

And, in either mode, a "thinking too precisely on the event" is itself a fault.

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THE PASSING OF PRIVILEGED UNIQUENESS

NOTIONS of "the Unique" function centrally in much of recent philosophy. The intuited "integral experience" (Bergson), "the unique qualitative situation" (Dewey), "ineradicable individuality" (James), subjectivity (Whitehead), "eidetic singularity" (Husserl), "thinghood" (Sellars), are examples of how concern with "uniqueness" is a characteristic emphasis crossing doctrinal lines.

There can be no presumption here to explicate these terms under some precise and definitive conception of uniqueness. Notoriously, they are not free from ambiguity in their functioning within their respective systems, and if any clarification of these notions is attempted it must take place in terms of the doctrines in question. Nevertheless while they are not precise notions they have something precise in common. There is unanimity on a fundamental change in attitude over the classical conceptions of uniqueness.

The latter may be briefly stated. Uniqueness is predicable of a privileged set of entities. These entities, whether things or classes, are "unique" or cognitively distinctive. To be unique is to be an *exception*, but such distinction is knowable.

The modern conception differs as follows. Uniqueness is a non-cognitive notion. It is a character of *any* discriminated thing whatever. It is not necessarily knowable, though it may be experienceable.

In discussing and attempting to clarify this shift in sense we shall confine ourselves to the problem as it affects the status of "natural" objects. This is not to disavow its unquestionable influence in political and moral theory, religion, and the philosophy of art. One is tempted to describe the transformation as a change in emphasis from "essence" to "existence"; but apart from the dubious connotations of such a characterization, it is far more significant to analyse the change in terms of the factors oper-

ative in bringing it about. To do this it is necessary to take the position that any metaphysical notion is in part an outcome of a concerted public effort to "understand" a world and that each public has a world more or less peculiar to it.

The science and cosmology of the middle ages and antiquity in effect presented a select group of unique objects. This was due to the lack of a comprehensive scheme of classification. Among such objects were the Sun (not yet classifiable nor even conceivable as *a* sun), the Earth (not a planet), the Moon (not a satellite), etc. While the vast majority of natural objects were plural, instantial, membered things, these were singular, non-instantial, and "unique."

A cosmology with these privileged unique things played an important role in the rise of class-essence theories in metaphysics, a view which attributed individuality to specific difference and denied it to the instantial particular. The theory that individuality belonged to the "special" (infima species) found perhaps its basic suggestion in those visible and important objects which were concrete unitary species. Uniqueness and individuality (as contrasted with particularity) thus carried a privileged sense of distinctive difference. On such a view these terms were sometimes used interchangeably with "essence"; but the point is that however differentiated, these were all cognitive or logical terms. To predicate them of things was considered an advance in knowledge or logical discrimination. And of course if one believes that some things are unique while others are not, then, no matter what is meant by "uniqueness," it is a synthetic predicate. The belief in uniqueness as a discriminable character of special existential objects was undoubtedly a factor in promoting conceptual realisms. Also the general belief that certain objects were in effect unclassifiable (just as a class itself is non-instantial) contributed to persuade pre-modern thought that classes were fixed. A developed nominalism in which classification is relative and partly arbitrary is hardly credible unless all objects are classifiable, since those which are not represent concretely a set of fixed unit classes empirically given.

What is significant for the present discussion is that uniqueness is here a privileged concept. To be unique is to be non-instantial; it is to be *one* but not *one of*. Only privileged objects (and classes) are unique and non-instantial. (The popular use of "special" in the sense of "unique" is of course an example of the classic attitude; so too when we use "individual," "singular" as adjectives carrying the sense of "special," "exceptional," or

"unique." Or again when we speak of some person or thing as "in a class by themselves" we are using the privileged notion of uniqueness.) *Given a world with privileged objects* we get a *metaphysic of privileged individuality* and a virtual identification of uniqueness, as a metaphysical notion, with "essence" or cognitive distinctiveness.

It is a commonplace that the world-view initiated by Copernicus and developed in modern cosmology brought about a concomitant change in theories of man's place in nature and his relation to this new world. This is usually discussed in terms of the change in the relative positions, sizes, and notions of the heavenly bodies as it affected theology and the metaphysics of an anthropocentric world-view. What is comparatively neglected in such discussion is that the new cosmology not only shifted things about, it performed an "absolute" task of comprehensive classification. It gathered into instantial membership all those objects hitherto left unclassified. The new facts of this world were all plural and no exception to instantial status could now be found. (Putting this into logical phraseology, "the Sun," for example, is no longer a proper name but an abbreviated definite description, namely, "the sun of our solar system.") Class-essence theories of uniqueness were thereby left without empirical support, particularly when biologists and physicists realized that classification was arbitrary and could be ascribed to objects in variant patterns. The demise of unique unclassified objects thus was a contributing factor in the resurgence of nominalism.

However ascribed, instantiality was pervasive. Uniqueness was nowhere if by uniqueness we mean non-instantiality. But even a new notion of uniqueness which could accommodate itself to the instantial character of all things is left without selective criteria. If uniqueness in some new sense is now ascribed to existential objects then it must be ascribed *to all objects indiscriminately*. It could no longer belong to some things and not to others. A metaphysic for a world of instantial objects has the alternative of rejecting uniqueness entirely or accepting it for all objects without exception. Yet if we attribute uniqueness to everything, the notion is transformed.

First, as has been said, uniqueness becomes "democratic." In its distributive sense, everything is itself uniquely.

Second, such uniqueness is no longer cognitive essence; it is a qualitative plus over and behind the logical, relational, and instantial character of scientific objects. The uniqueness of a thing (or event or situation) is in the last analysis "ineffable" and un-

characterizable in terms of reflective experience. Acceptance of such a notion had led some philosophers to propose an ineradicable ontological pluralism. The appeal for the notion is intuitional, and this leads to the third point.

For uniqueness as a non-cognitive character must yet be experienceable. Those philosophers who talk of "unique character" of things, events, or situations are at pains to show in what sense they believe that experience of such qualitative character is possible. Distinctions are introduced between types of experience: intuitive and conceptual (Bergson, Croce), cognitive and perceptual (many Realists), logical and esthetic (Instrumentalists), natural and eidetic (Phenomenologists), essential and existential, etc. Basic to all such distinctions is an attempt to allow also for experience of a non-logical nature. However characterized, "uniqueness" as some sort of tertiary quality of a situation or thing, is, to use the lowest common denominator, experienceable.

In sum, uniqueness is transformed from a classic cognitive notion of definitive individuality to a notion primarily esthetic, equivalent to the brute ineffable qualitativeness of a thing.[1]

Such a radical inversion did not take place overnight. It is on the third point, the question of experienceability, that we can sketch roughly the history of modern philosophy in the familiar terms of its treatment of the ineffable.

Kant held that our experience of the phenomenal world "is possible" by means of constitutive ideas. The world we experience is presented "thus." The thing-in-itself, isolated on such a view as ineffable, was also not experienceable. This contention (at least in the first *Critique*) that possible experience depended on constitutive ideas was Kant's postulate of ideality, and ideality which was transcendental since he believed in the existence of the inexperienceable thing-in-itself.

Post-Kantian idealists accepted the postulate of constitutive ideality; but in declining to accept the existence of the inexperienceable, their idealism was "objective" or ontological. The world is not merely *presented thus,* it *is thus.* For Hegel there

[1] Nor could it now be proper to ask whether uniqueness or qualitativeness is a universal. Universality is formal similarity or dissimilarity with respect to synthetic predicates. The uniqueness of instantial things can only be a fully concrete dissimilarity, i.e., dissimilarity with respect to nothing at all. Concrete because "qualitative," "ineffable," "immediate," "eidetic," "non-cognitive." To say that A is dissimilar to *anything* which is not A is equivalent to asserting that A is A. The A-ness of A can not be cognitively explicated. "Uniqueness" is therefore not a predicate of a thing any more than its "existence" is.

was no ineffable, for Kant there was no way to experience it since it *was* ineffable.

If we take Dewey as a representative of post-modern thought (by no means a characteristic one), we find him departing from these viewpoints in two ways. For Dewey all ideas are, to use the Kantian terminology, "regulative"; no ideas are constitutive. This disposes of idealism. (It also bypasses realism, but that is another matter.) Secondly, Dewey maintains that experience of the "ineffable" is possible and that in fact such "primary" experiences are the crucial terms in the growth of reflective regulative knowledge. For Dewey reflective experience "is possible" in virtue of primary experience. Thus Dewey is representative of the new emphasis on the non-cognitive unique in experience. Yet for him, though not for others, qualitative uniqueness is not an embarrassment which the idealists chose to ignore. The notion is given a central place in a new "deduction of the categories" of regulative knowledge.

On the question of whether it is possible to discriminate *an* experience which shall be independent and unmediated, recent philosophy is doctrinally at odds. For Dewey any discrimination within subject-matter is logical and regulative. We can *have* a unique experience qualitatively without discriminating (i.e., mediating) it logically.[2] On the far side of this controversy is Husserl, who invites us to experience his pure essences. Bergson too makes claims for unmediated experience of another kind. Existentialists insist on the experience of discriminated immediacy which is alogical and pure. The problem is important in the present context only insofar as it indicates that, for post-modern thought, "uniqueness" or qualitative individuality" is experienceable. The various senses in which one may call such experience "pure" or deny its purity is beyond the scope of the present discussion, though it inevitably decides different contexts for philosophers in their attribution of uniqueness.

Another question which must be mentioned is the current attempt to define individuality so as to give words like "individual," "thing," "particular," a stable meaning in discourse. This enterprise is important but it usurps "individuality" for a different sense than the one taken to be synonymous with uniqueness. For suppose the criteria for predicating individuality are such that a toothache is a non-individual while an electron is an "indi-

[2] That such "having" is nevertheless referential and experience *of*, is clear from this remark: "there is ground for unsophisticated recognition of use and enjoyment of things as natural, as belonging to the things as well as to us" (*Experience and Nature*, p. 108).

vidual."[3] The attribution of qualitive individuality may well apply in reverse.[4]

We have, then, three common and distinct senses of individuality: (a) privileged cognitive uniqueness, (b) "thinghood," (c) "democratic," qualitative uniqueness. In (a) and (c) "individuality" is taken as synonymous with uniqueness." In (a) and (b) "individuality" is a synthetic predicate.

For empirical philosophy the task is one of defining a role for qualitative individuality. Unless this is adequately done it remains an anti-rationalist embarrassment which the idealists did well to ignore.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Power of Art. JOHN M. WARBEKE. New York: Philosophical Library. 1951. ix, 493 pp. $6.00.

Aestheticians are far more agreed about the sensuous and formal qualities of art than about those which Professor Warbeke calls "cognitive." He says that while nothing is meant in art but what is perceived, this is felt to mean more than could be stated in words. One wishes that he had taken account of the recent discussion of this problem by Charles Morris, Mrs. Langer, Hospers, and others; or that his book had been ready for them to consider. But, without being very technical, it is as knowing as any, and tells the essentials. For Warbeke the meaning in art is rarely logical: to speak of a work as true is a way of praising it as excellent, sensuously, rhythmically, imaginatively, with all the richness of perception and emotion. Meaning here is not scientific but feelingful. Yet it is insight into life, hence cognitive.

The burden of the book is that the arts bring home to us the

[3] See the abstracts in the Bulletin of the 48th annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division: "The Category of the Individual," by Victor Lowe; "Role of Individuals in Discourse and Knowledge," by E. L. Beardsley. Both Mr. Lowe's and Mrs. Beardsley's criteria for individuation rule out toothaches as individuals while including entities such as electrons.

[4] This in fact is Dewey's position. A toothache is an "enjoyment" and as such unique, an electron is a postulated entity having only instrumental status. Writing on Dewey's view of the status of "the objects of physical theory which do not possess the qualitative differentia of everyday experience," Nagel says: "A mystifying puzzle arises only if the former are converted into another set of individuals which requires to be directly encountered if they are to be adequately known" ("Dewey's Theory of Natural Science," in *John Dewey, A Symposium*, New York, Dial Press, 1950, p. 238).

values of the world as it is, and its possibilities. Not that the arts have a special revelation. Any ideas in art are subject to the usual tests. But art gives ideas power. The power of art "identifies us with our environment on a high plane," so as to mold the community and the individual. But we are warned that art cannot do this if consciously used as a tool. This is the paradox of art. It is in keeping with the Platonic and Aristotelian view, shared by Santayana, Dewey, Gotshalk, and Nahm, that the best friend of the good life is art when it is good art.

In taking up particular arts Warbeke shows how sculpture expresses ideals, how music integrates personality, how poetry brings adjustment, how painting affects the quality of existence. Though the influence of art may not be wholesome he feels that the good far outweighs the bad. The beneficial effect of the arts is seen to depend upon education in them, not so much a deliberate or formal training as close acquaintance and the "contagion of love." Then art is the very symbol of freedom and hope "in a mechanized and authoritarian world," especially the art of drama. If this art were not used for amusement and to make money it might be "the greatest force in civilization." Hope is in the municipal or community theater. The fabulous techniques of the movies have not yet done much for drama, because their emphasis on narrative and action interferes with the contemplative attitude essential to art, and stirs impulses to crime with a directness that statistics substantiate. The heart of the problem is held to be misrepresentation—not that evil is shown on the screen, but that the gamut of life is not fairly offered.

An interesting distinction is made between building, as serving a useful purpose, and architecture as serving the spirit, though no building is devoid of architecture. Men's character is exhibited in what they build. "Small resources were available in many a charming English village . . . And what a ghastly picture is presented from the Lincoln Highway traveling west from the financial center of the world!" Architecture is largely a matter of "social cooperation and pride," it is "a peculiarly social art," and the culmination of the art is in the planning of a city, a region. Here at least Professor Warbeke seems to admit what he mostly avoids—the idea that art as art can have a social purpose clearly intended and not simply supervening. But he would limit the social usefulness of architecture as an art to "certain inner or mental satisfactions."

When thinking of the influence of art upon life leads him to the union of art with religion he insists again upon distinguishing the arts as having no ulterior purpose, whereas religion has practi-

cal ends in view. It intends "works" for the improvement of life. But religion depends on the intuitions of art, especially of literature, for its own contemplation. The author's hope is that the social character of the arts, and their common enjoyment, will foster generosity, sympathy, and peace. But the ideal to which the arts lead is already enjoyed in them. "The very qualities and character of a thing of beauty best describe for us the most nearly perfect and happy life."

One may wonder whether artists, art-lovers, and art-critics are more generous and free from jealousy than other people. But the man this philosopher of art was will support his argument. His posthumous book will reveal to readers who did not know him what Professor Warbeke's friends have known: his gentle wisdom about the fine qualities of life, his wish to share them, and his confidence that aesthetic experience is the one great way to the common good—if we remember that the good which art does must be forgotten in the good it is.

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Pflicht und Neigung. Die Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit. HANS REINER. (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, Band V.) Meisenheim/Glan: Westkulturverlag Anton Hain. 1951. xii, 316 pp. 19.50 DM.

This detailed work in systematic ethics must receive consideration among the important recent studies in the field. Though it makes no claim to newness of viewpoint, but may be regarded as a further refinement of the tradition of Scheler and Hartmann, its analyses are so sensitive and at the same time so objective that it clarifies and imparts freshness to many of the positions in their thought.

Professor Reiner approaches the problems of ethics through the exchange of opinions between Kant and Schiller on the relationship between duty and inclination. But his own answer to the questions raised in that celebrated discussion leads him to an empirical synthesis of value and duty, a descriptive reformulation of the types of moral feeling, and a normative but non-metaphysical definition of the morally good.

The book falls into three parts. The first contains Reiner's examination of the Kant-Schiller dispute. Both men, he argues, were in error in claiming to agree in principle, for the issue at stake between them was deeper than they saw. Reiner's own answer turns about a criticism of Kant's conception of duty and the categorical imperative which adds new considerations to other recent studies. Beginning as he did with the will, Kant was unable

to relate man's drives and strivings to it, and hence missed the question of the possible harmony of the two factors. As a result he also failed to give an adequate account of the role of moral maxims, which are not merely rules for individual acts, but the bases for particular attitudes which may themselves become objects of value. The synthesis of duty and inclination is found, then, in recognizing that though duty itself is derived from acknowledged values, the resulting attitudes of obligation become objects of inclination and feeling. The autonomous morality which rests upon such inclinations, moreover, is of a higher type than a merely axionomous ethics.

From this argument follow the more systematic analyses of moral attitudes in the second, and by far the most substantial, part of the book. Most helpful in the author's construction of his ethics in his defense of an empirical method. Treated reasonably, experienced feelings of value and duty suffice to arrive at a normative system, and the ontological references of Scheler and Hartmann are not merely unnecessary but confusing. Similarly, the empirical sense of freedom is an adequate ground, without any metaphysical interpretation, for responsibility. Using this method, Reiner undertakes a phenomenological account of the criteria of evaluation and of the types of moral inclinations. To Scheler's norm based upon the height of values, and Hartmann's based upon strength (Reiner would prefer urgency) he adds such standards as temporal immanence, quantity of realization, probability of success, presence of a sense of need, consistency of the conservative and creative elements in value experience, social coöperation, personal capacities and situation, and finally, a residual principle which completes the others—conscience. Values are classified as relative and absolute, subjective and objective, fruitive and non-fruitive; and the moral imperative demands action which strives for fruitive-objective values rather than non-fruitive, subjective values, and which aims ultimately at "the highest preponderance of objective value."

People vary in their inclinations toward duty, however, in that they may develop feelings either of responsibility or of honor. Responsibility is directed at values; honor sets up moral ideals as prior to value, and thus aims at self-imposed moral controls. The axionomous morality resting on values is thus not fully developed morality, and Kant's emphasis upon duty, while not the only foundation of the good, expresses its highest form.

Reiner's concern, however, is with the application of moral thought to practical situations. And in spite of the neatness of his distinctions, their application is not so obvious. The third

section of the work, in which he undertakes to gauge the moral attitudes of Western peoples by his standards, falls short of success. Restricting his detailed examination to the Greek, Germanic, and Christian traditions, but promising further studies in primitive and Oriental cultures, he concludes that there is a qualified basis for moral consensus. A certain consciousness of duty is, he concludes, everywhere evident, but its form varies from group to group, and from one age to another. Thus there exist in all Western cultures inclinations toward freedom, reason, and fruitive and objective values, but the theonomous forms of Biblical religion differ from the autonomous forms in Classical civilization. Similarly, Reiner suggests, there are deep differences between the honor-feeling of the Japanese and the responsibility-feelings of the Chinese.

The danger of naiveté in such generalizations will be apparent. Some of the historical studies, however, by which they are supported —for instance, a long discussion of the historical meanings of the Golden Rule—are valuable excursions into the history of ethics.

Reiner's project of an empirical investigation of the distribution and variations in moral sentiment does not promise great success. But his own ethical analysis shows a fresh, empirical self-sufficiency that is wholesome, His criticism of Heidegger's strictures upon duty-ethics and goods-ethics alike is a particularly useful part of his book, though his hope of giving existentialism a moral direction through his analyses will no doubt prove to be unwarranted optimism. They will certainly contribute, however, to a growing area of agreement in ethical theory.

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Goethe's Faust as a Renaissance Man: Parallels and Prototypes. HAROLD JANTZ. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1951. xvii, 198 pp. $3.50.

Within clearly definable limits, this is an illuminating monograph. Unfortunately, the preface and the first and last chapter are apt to confuse the reader with their long discussions of what the author is trying to do, and what he is not trying to do; but the following quotation seems a fair summary:

> The chief question posed by this study is whether the values and principles, the personalities and actions of the drama, in their larger interrelations and sequences, resemble those of the Renaissance more than they do those of Goethe's own age. The answer seems to be, yes, they do. The drama is not subjective and not of the eighteenth century with some decorative Renaissance coloring; it is largely objective, of the Renaissance with some intentional anachronisms and with the personal coloring and blending which accompanied the act of poetic creation. [P. 124.]

One may question whether the book proves as much as all that, but one will have to admit that it offers a number of stimulating suggestions. And Professor Jantz himself says elsewhere:

> There is no need to deny the validity of the standard interpretations. *Faust* is indeed expressive of its author personally and also of some secondary tendencies of the eighteenth century. This old thesis is certainly true. . . . The old and the new are not mutually contradictory, but complementary. [P. 4.]

As an example of the author's more suggestive points, one may refer to his demonstration that Wagner—the pedant of Part One, who in Part Two is intent on making an artificial human being—represents, even in his first scene, a particular type of Renaissance humanism; so the continuity of the two parts of the drama is greater in this respect than has often been supposed (*vide* Michael Toxites, a 16th century Paracelsian). This is well taken and certainly does not preclude that what makes the Wagner of Part One an unforgettable experience is not the kind of thing Professor Jantz discusses, but his timelessness.

If this consideration, which is no less applicable to Jantz's other points, suggests *one* of the limitations of his book, there are at least two others. First, true to its subtitle, the study deals with "parallels and prototypes"—not influences. The author makes no claim that Goethe was aware of most of these parallels—not even in the case of Nicolas of Cusa and Pico della Mirandola, whose philosophies Jantz considers very similar to that of the drama. At most, it is suggested that Goethe, with his wonderful intuition, divined the central tenets of the "Renaissance man."

Secondly, every piece of erudition is taken ever so seriously, while Goethe's sublimely ironic playfulness is overlooked. This is especially true of the references to the last scenes (pp. 111 f. and 133 f.). Like Hohlfeld—to whom the book is dedicated, and whose articles on Faust's death scene is cited as authority for its interpretation (p. 164)—Jantz ignores Mephistopheles' aside, that Faust only *thinks* he is winning land from the ocean for people to live on. And even if one should mistrust Mephistopheles' testimony, which barely precedes Faust's last speech, there is no getting around the fact that the blind Faust, who dreams of some future time when he might stand "with free men on free ground," has only just then expressed his delight at hearing "the throng that slaves [!] for me"—and these magical minions of Mephistopheles are not at all doing the work of which Faust speaks, but are even then digging his grave. Scholars have too often overlooked such deliberate ironies, partly because they lacked Goethe's sense of humor, partly because they were too intent on making a hero of Faust. Although Jantz is not unaware of Faust's shortcomings,

it still seems in line with the latter tendency when he says: "Faust is as imperfect, fallible, sinful, reprehensible as Michelangelo was" (p. 47). Or Michelangelo must have been guilty of much that I never heard of. On the other hand, the difference in actual accomplishment seems striking.

There are, in short, statements about the drama as a whole which one might well dispute, as when Jantz overstates his case by saying: "the claim that *Faust* contains many a fortuitous accretion is not true at all" (p. 117). But in spite of all such reservations, the book is, for the most part, pleasantly unpretentious, and the many parallels do shed some new light on *Faust*. Beyond that, one may applaud Jantz's repudiation of the "tendency toward seeing Faust the man as a specifically German phenomenon. On the contrary, Faust is throughout and in essentials a European" (p. 128). Or should we say: he is, with all his failings, as supranational and as timeless as Prometheus?

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Professor Y. P. Mei, now of the University of Cincinnati, has been appointed Tallman Visiting Professor of Chinese Philosophy at Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine, for the academic year 1952–53.

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